We show that the consideration of Stackelberg equilibrium and reasonable conjecture equilibria (R.e.E.) provide sorne foundation to the concept of limit pricing.
Introduction
This paper deals with the problem of entry deterrence in two different ways. First, we analyze conditions under which entry prevention is the best strategy for an incumbent firm, and second, we link entry prevention with another important field of industrial organization, the analysis of reasonable conjectures.
That entry prevention may be of interest for incumbent firms has been studied by Osborne (1973) , Spence (1977) , Dixit (1979) , Salop (1979) , Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Omori and Yarrow (1982) . In aH these papers equilibrium concept is sorne kind of Stackelberg equilibrium in which potential entrants behave in Cournot fashion and the incumbent firm is a Stackelberg leader. We foHow this approach by widening the model to aHow more general conjectures for entrants.
The theory of reasonable conjectures has been developed by Hahn (1978) , in the framework of an exchange economy, and Hart (1982) , in an oligopoly model with decreasing returns to scale. This theory attempts to endogenize conjectures assuming that firms choose those conjectures which maximize profits. 'BasicaHy the conjectures of firms are reasonable if, given the conjectures of aH other firms, no firm can increase its profit by departing from its own conjectures. That is, a resonable conjectural equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium where the strategies of firms are conjectures' [Hart (1982, The idea that conjectures are the 'right' strategic space is quite appealing since conjectures can represent very different types of behaviour. However, Hart's results point out the existence of a large number of R.C.E. [Hart (1985, p. 129) ]. In the final section we will argue that if economies of scale are considered, this may be changed.
Another interesting feature of R.CE. is that, in such an equilibrium, conjectures must be local1y correct [see Hart (1982) pp. [19] [20] . This last requirement has been used in the literature under the name of consistent conjectural variations [see Bresnahan (1981) , Perry (1982) , Tanaka (1985) and Ulph (1983) ]. Sorne of their results will be discussed in the final section.
In this paper we will prove that a kind of generalized Stackelberg equilibrium prevents the entry of any potential entrant (Proposition 1). Moreover under slightIy stronger conditions, the limit price (see ahead definition 5) is a generalized Stackelberg equilibrium price (Proposition 2). Final1y we analyze R.CE. We do not obtain a complete characterization of the set of R.CE. in our economy (which differs from Hart's paper (1982) in that economies of scale are present here). We will prove that the usual Stackelberg equilibrium is a R.CE. That provides a rationale for the Sylos postulate (Le., the assumption that potential entrants behave in a Cournot way). This is our Proposition 3. We end the paper with sorne comments on the significance of our results.
Major definitions
We will consider a homogeneous goods market in which there are m firms. Firm 1 is the incumbent and firms 2,3, ... , m are potential entrants.
Let Xi be the outpout of firm i and X= Ii= 1 Xi' The price of the product is p. Let p(x) be the inverse demand function which is assumed to be strictIy decreasing. Profits for firm i are n¡ (X¡,X_i)=P(X)xi-c¡(x¡), X-i=X-X i is the output of the remaining firms and C¡(Xi) is the cost function of firm i with C¡(O) =0. We will assume that c¡ (x¡}=cj(x j) if Xi=Xj Vi, j=2, 3, ... , m, i.e. they share the same cost function.
The interpretation of a conjecture is that 'given a status quo position where the price is Pand the firm is producing Xi' firm i conjectures that if it changed its supply to Xi' the equilibrium price would change to !Xi(x¡, P, X¡)' [Hart (1982) ].
Definition 2. The correspondence F¡(p, Xi) is said to be the reaction correspondence for firm i = 2, 3, ... ,m if
We will assume that firms 2,3, ... , m share the same conjecture. Therefore their reaction correspondences are identical.
Definition 3. A tuple (x~, ... ,x:",pS) is said to be a Generalized Stackelberg Equilibrium (G.S.E.) with firm 1 as a leader if (a) pS = p(x~+ ... + x:"), (b) (xf, ... ,x:",pS) maximizes nI (xI,x-d subject to x¡EF¡ (pS,xf), i=2,3,oo.,m. That is, at a G.S.E. firms 2,3, ... , m maximize profits according to their conjectures and firm 1, subject to this constraint, maximizes its profits. Notice that if conjectures for firms 2,3,oo.,m were of the Cournot type (see definition 7) a G.S.E. would be the usual notion of a Stackelberg equilibrium. 
The previous definition is taken from [Hart (1982, pp. 5-6)J. Condition (2) requires x* to be a conjectural equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium relative to conjectures ai, ... , a~. Condition (3) states that each firm is maximizing profits given the conjectures of the other firms.
The motivation for studying R.C.E. is 'The idea that firms do not care about the correctness of their conjectures per se, but only about whether they are maximizing profits. In a R.C.E. while there may be errors in a firm's conjecture, they are not of the sort that lead to reduce profits' [Hart (1982) pp.2)].
We end this section with a definition of a special kind of conjectures. 
Results
We add the fol1owíng assumption that characleríze structure of the índustry:
Statement (a) is a way of introducíng economíes of sea le; (b) implies that the number of potential entrants is large enough and (e) that the incumbent firm ís active at the G.S. E. Now let us introduce an addítional requirement in order to prove that limit price is a G.S.E. price. 2 Assumption 2 (a) The profit func1ion of the incumbent is quasieoncave in Xl IOmorj am:l Yarmw U9821 ha~e pm~ed a stmrlar pmposrtlon. They modet a more generar case for a market WHh a heterogeneous product, bU! their assumptions are somewhat stmnger In particular we do no! requlre the Incumbent firm to be Idenllcal to the potential entrants and we do not need fixed COSIS 6ut the main dítTerence is that in our case conJectures of the entrants are not necessarily Cournot, 1 e , (he so called Sylos postulate IS nOI necessary for our proof (see Section 4, 2). We conclude proving that the usual Stackelberg equilibrium notion is a R.CE.
Proposition 3. Given Assumption 1, Stackelberg equilibrium is a R.CE.
Proof It is clear that (XSb O, ... , O) is an equilibrium relative to sorne conjectures, i.e., part 2) in Definition 6 is fulfilIed. If firm 1 holds Xl constant, then no firm 2,3, ... , m can make a profit since Xl prevents entry. Therefore Cournot conjectures maximize profits for these firms (many other conjectures would possibly yield this conclusion as welI). In addition, if firms 2,3, ... , m hold Cournot conjectures, firm 1 cannot do better than to choose the Stackelberg conjecture since, by its very definition, it maximizes profits for firm 1 if 2,3, ... , m hold their Cournot conjectures.
A similar proposition has been provided by D. Ulph (1983) for the case of m=2 (but Ulph uses a consistent conjectural equilibrium instead of a R.CE.). However Ulph's proof does not generalize for m> 2. This is so because the logic behind his proof is that once firm 1 has chosen Xl (and the correspondent Stackelberg conjecture), the Cournot-type conjecture for firm 2 is 10calIy consistent. However if a third firm with a Cournot-type conjecture is introduced, the aboye conjecture for firm 2 ceases to be consistent, since X 3 will, in general, change if X2 is changed. FinalIy note that Proposition 1 is robust to the introduction of more incumbents. Indeed, assuming that each incumbent behaves both as Cournot with respect to any other incumbent and as a generalized Stackelberg leader with respect to similar potential entrants, we can prove similar resuIts to Proposition 1. In this sense, imperfect coordination among incumbents is irrelevant to show that G.S.E. prevents entry [for problems raised by such imperfect coordination, consuIt Gilbert and Vives (1984) ]. However this equilibrium is not a R.CE. since Cournot behaviour is seldom reasonable 30bviously if Rt( -) is slriclly quasiconcave then p' = pt is the unique O.S.E. price. when more than one firm is active (see the aboye discussion on Ulph's result when m>2).
Final cornrnents
(1) Propositions 1 and 2 can be regarded as sorne kind of 'domino theorem'. Indeed the existence of an inactive potential competitor prevents entry for any potential entrants. The interpretation of this result is that when m is small, limit pricing may be an expensive strategy (i.e., a low pi causes low profits). However if the number of potential competitors is large enough, the cost of limit pricing is small in comparison to the cost of having all these firms in the market. Therefore the right alternative for the incumbent firm is to prevent entry.
(2) The most common criticism of limit pricing theory is that it is based on an assumption (the Sylos postulate) that is not derived from the rational behaviour of agents. This paper refutes this view in two ways. First the so called Sylos postulate is not necessary for the theory. All we need is that potential entrants share the same conjecture and that at least one firm remain inactive. Second, the usual Stackelberg equilibrium is a R.C.E. and therefore rational in sorne sense. (3) Even though our approach is static, Propositions 1 and 2 may be of interest to the dynamic theory of the dominant firmo Suppose we start stage zero with an incumbent and one potential entrant. Suppose also that the G.S.E. implies a positive output for the entrant [as may occur in Dixit (1979) ]. Now suppose that a new competitor arrives at stage one and that G.S.E. again implies a positive output for this firm, and that in periods 2,3, . .. we have identical results. Our Propositions 1 and 2 imply that at sorne stage the behaviour of the incumbent will change dramatically. Indeed, sooner or later, if the incumbent behaves as a Stackelberg leader, it will find incentives to fight (and to win) a price war against its competitors. (4) Conjectures which are used in the proof of Proposition 3 can be shown to be consistent, i.e., potential entrants are right in their assumption that total output is fixed and the incumbent is right in assuming that potential entrants are of the Cournot type. Therefore our R.C.E. is in fact a consistent conjectural equilibrium of the kind discussed in the Introduction.
However our Proposition 3 is in conflict with the finding of sorne authors concerning the properties of consistent conjectural equilibrium (C.C.E.). For example it has been claimed that under increasing returns to scale no C.C.E. exists [see Bresnahan (1981) p. 939 and Perry (1982) p. 202] . But actually all they prove is that no symmetrical C.C.E. exists with more than one active firmo Our Proposition 3 implies that C.C.E. exists when only one firm in the market survives. Therefore putting together our Proposition 3 and the Bresnahan-Perry result we get the impression that under economies of scale C.C.E. and R.C.E. may imply strong restrictions for the equilibrium set: in fact the case may be that only one firm can be active.
FinaUy notice also that our analysis refutes the belief that in a situation of free entry only competitive equilibrium is a c.c.E. [see Perry (1982) and Tanaka (1985) ].
(5) An interesting problem (which is not treated in our paper) is to study welfare associated with entry prevention and with competition. Some exampIes -obtained from the authors on request -show that the sum of consumer and producer surpluses in a linear economy, are larger under entry prevention that under competition ala Cournot in almost any possible case.
